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When Aristotle argues at the Metaphysics Z.17, 1041b11–33 that a whole, which is not a heap, 
contains ‘something else’, i.e. the form, besides the elements, it is not clear whether or not the 
form is a proper part of the whole. I defend the claim that the form is not a proper part within 
the context of the relevant passage, since the whole is divided into elements, not into elements 
and the form. Different divisions determine different senses of ‘part’, and thus the form is not 
a part in the same sense as the elements are parts. I object to Koslicki’s (2006) interpretation, 
according to which the form is a proper part along the elements in a single sense of ‘part’, 
although she insists that the form and the elements belong to different categories. I argue that 
Koslicki’s reading involves a category mistake, i.e. the conjunction of items that do not belong 
to the same category (Goldwater 2018). Since for Aristotle parthood presupposes some kind 
of similarity of parts, the conjunction of form and elements requires treating these items as 
somehow belonging to the same category, e.g. ‘being’, but no such category exists.
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1. Introduction
At Met. Z.17, 1041b11–33, Aristotle shows that a whole, which is not a heap, contains ‘something else’, i.e. 
the form, besides the elements, which are present in the whole as matter and into which the whole perishes 
upon division. It seems clear that the elements are literally parts of the whole, but what about the form? In 
general with respect to Z.17 commentators either deny that form is a part1 or allow the possibility that form 
is a part. Among the latter, some take the stance that form is a part without making it precise what sort of 
part form is,2 while others think that form is a proper part.3 Among those who think that Z.17 supports the 
view that form is a proper part Koslicki (2006) offers the most interesting proposal.4
 1 Yu (2003: 74) takes ‘element’ to be synonymous with ‘component’ and states that in Z.17 ‘form is no longer a component alongside 
matter, but a principle to organize all material elements into a unity’. Scaltsas (1994) defends a stronger position, arguing that Z.17 
is a proof that the form is never a part of the whole. According to Scaltsas (1994: 114), ‘Aristotle’s solution [at Z.17] applies to any 
part–whole relation, whether the parts are concrete or abstract’. Scaltsas’ position conflicts with Aristotle’s statements in Δ.25, 
1023b19–22 (and elsewhere) that in one sense of ‘part’ form is a part of the whole alongside matter.
 2 Morrison calls form ‘aspect, component, complement [of matter]’ (1996: 199), ‘constituent (“part” in an extended sense of “part”) 
of the object’ (1996: 204). Morrison’s reason for this seems to be the fact that form is the ‘indwelling cause of being’ (1996: 199), 
which ‘cannot be separate from that of whose being it is the cause’ (1996: 195). Morrison has left the terminology deliberately 
vague (1996: 199) so that it cannot be determined what sort of part form is supposed to be. Burnyeat (2001: 61) implicates that 
the form of a syllable, i.e. the order of the letters, is some sort of component, but ‘is not a component on a par with the letters into 
which the syllable can be dissolved’.
 3 Lewis (1996: 63), Haslanger (1994: 151), Koslicki (2006: 725–727).
 4 There are few commentators who draw evidence from Z.17 to support the view that form is a proper part. To my knowledge the 
only other elaborate view besides Koslicki’s is Haslanger’s (1994). Haslanger thinks that form and matter are proper parts (by 
‘proper parts’ she means parts that are not identical to the whole, 1994: 130 n. 1). Haslanger (1994: 151) assumes that form and 
matter are parts and takes the text at Z.17 as a proof for the thesis that the matter of a substance is not identical to the substance. 
This helps her to prove that matter and form are proper parts. It is not clear whether Haslanger thinks that form is a different kind 
of part from matter. Haslanger hints at this possibility: ‘the claim that form is not an element of sensible substance still permits 
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I will object to Koslicki (2006) and argue that Z.17, 1041b11–33 supports the opposite view. It has to be 
stressed that my aim is not to argue that the passage at Z.17 is the ultimate disproof of the proper parthood 
of form. Rather, my aim is to defend the claim that the form is not a proper part within the context of the rel-
evant passage. The form fails to be a proper part when the whole is divided into the elements of the whole, 
and that is exactly what is done in Z.17, 1041b11–33. However, when the whole is divided differently – into 
matter and form – the form could be taken to be a proper part alongside matter. Different divisions of the 
whole yield items that are parts in different senses of ‘part’. Thus, in one sense of ‘part’ the form indeed 
might be a proper part, while in another sense the form definitely fails to be a proper part.
One might wonder why it is so important to recognize that in some contexts the form fails to be a proper 
part and why this should count as an objection to Koslicki’s interpretation. The brief answer, which I will 
elaborate here, is that in certain cases the form is not the right sort of entity to be regarded as another part 
of the whole – the form is indeed something distinct from the elements of the whole, but it is so distinct 
from the elements that it cannot count as a part in addition to the elements. Koslicki thinks that elements 
and form are parts ‘in a single sense of “part”’ (2006: 727), albeit they do not belong to the same category 
(2006: 723, see section 4).5 But it seems to me that this qualifies as a category mistake, if by ‘category 
 mistake’ we understand the conjunction of items that do not belong to the same category (Goldwater 2018: 
342). Koslicki’s argument for the proper parthood of form suggests that elements and form are somehow 
similar enough to be conjoined, i.e. the form is like an element at least in the sense that it can be counted 
as another part together with other elements. I will argue, however, that one of the important lessons that 
Aristotle teaches us in Z.17 is that elements and form cannot be conjoined – the form is not another part to 
be added to the elements – or else one is faced with unpleasant consequences.
I will proceed as follows:
1) I will summarize Aristotle’s argument at Z.17, 1041b11–33 without adding anything that 
is not already implicit in the text. This summary will make manifest to which propositions 
Aristotle is committed.
2) I will show that the passage implies that the form is not a proper part (according to a certain 
sense of ‘part’).
3) I will summarize Koslicki’s (2006) view, which uses the passage as supporting the thesis that 
form is a proper part.
4) I will point out what is problematic about Koslicki’s (2006) view.
Before addressing the central topic of the article it is necessary to avert a few potential misunderstandings.
1) In contemporary mereology it is understood that ‘part’ is a relational predicate such that mereological 
principles, which restrict this relational predicate, either hold or fail to hold of relations, not of objects. 
However, Aristotle seems to talk about parts as if the referent of ‘part’ were an object, not the relation of 
parthood in which a certain object stands to another object. If this indeed were so, it would make no sense 
to try to characterize Aristotle’s notion of ‘part’ in terms of mereological principles. Luckily, the difficulty is 
only verbal. Aristotle has to admit that ‘part’ is a relational predicate (πρός τι), if he maintains that ‘half’ is 
a relational predicate – ‘when there is a half there is a double’ (Cat. 7, 7b17, trans. Ackrill 1963). Just as there 
is no half without a double (7b19–20), there is no part without a whole. If something is a part, it is a part of 
something. Although Aristotle focuses on parts as objects and not on the parthood relation, he does not con-
fuse objects with the relation. Rather, he talks about parts in so far as they are parts of something, namely, 
form to be a part of a different kind’ (1994: 132). Moreover, according to Haslanger, there can be ‘hybrid part–whole relations 
which combine various sorts of part’ (1994: 135 n. 12). If by ‘kinds of part’ or ‘sorts of part’ Haslanger means ‘senses of part’, then 
she should allow a whole to consist of matter in one sense of ‘part’ and form in another sense of ‘part’. A whole would consist of a 
single part in different senses. But this is awkward (see Koslicki 2007: 134–135 n. 11). Furthermore, Haslanger (1994: 134) argues 
that different kinds of part are distinguished in terms of different principles of division. If the principle of division is X, then the 
outcome is X-parts. Thus, if there is a principle of division, according to which both form and matter are parts, these should be 
parts in the same sense of ‘part’.
 5 Koslicki argues that ‘both the form and the matter are proper parts of a matter/form-compound, strictly and literally speaking, 
and according to a single sense of “part”’ (2006: 727). I agree with this, but then Koslicki adds a remark, which I cannot accept: ‘the 
“something extra,” the source of the unity of the whole, [is] itself a proper part of the whole, alongside the remaining, nonformal 
components’ (2006: 727). This suggests that the ‘remaining, nonformal components’, i.e. the elements, are identified with matter 
and are taken as a plurality of parts, to which the ‘something extra,’ i.e. the form, is then added as a further formal component 
according to the same sense of ‘part’.
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he takes into account their relational nature. In general, Aristotle treats relations in terms of ‘relata, but he 
addresses these relata in so far as they possess relational predicates’ (Morales 1994: 256, original emphasis).
2) Contemporary mereologists typically assume that ‘part’ is a univocal notion, which obeys a fixed set of mere-
ological principles (but, of course, there is controversy over which principles best capture the notion of ‘part’). 
In contrast, Aristotle says that ‘part is used in several senses’ (Met. Z.10, 1034b32) and he gives a list of senses of 
‘part’ at Met. Δ.25. What should one make of this? Aristotle could mean either that (a) there is no uniform set of 
principles for all senses of ‘part’ or that (b) for a given principle, it cannot be applied to conjoin different senses 
of ‘part’. I will show that at least (b) is true and leave open the question whether also (a) is true (see section 5).
3) For the purposes of this article I will address two Aristotelian senses of ‘part’: a) elements as parts and b) 
form and matter as parts. One might wonder whether besides the parthood relation in which an element 
stands to a whole and a parthood relation in which form or matter stand to a whole there is also a third 
parthood relation in which an element stands to the matter of the whole. The answer is negative. Aristotle is 
not committed to the view that the elements of a whole are also parts of its matter. Aristotle admits that ele-
ments are material parts, i.e. parts as matter (μόρια ὡς ὕλη), and material parts are parts of the composite 
whole (σύνολον) (Z.11, 1037a24–26), they are present in the whole as matter (Z.17, 1041b31–33), but they 
are not thereby parts of matter. Matter is not an independent item, which is divisible into, or compoundable 
out of, elements. Strictly speaking, something counts as matter of the whole when it is in the whole, not 
outside of it, since matter requires form for which it is the matter. Elements post divisionem are ‘matter’ of 
the whole only homonymously, since they are parts of the whole only homonymously. Outside the whole 
the elements are independent items. Aristotle endorses the so-called Homonymy Principle: a part that is 
separated from the whole is a part in name only (see Z.11, 1036b30–2).
2. Aristotle’s Argument at Z.17, 1041b11–33
In brief, at Z.17, 1041b11–33 Aristotle presents the following argument:
1. A whole, which is not a heap, is not identical to the elements, into which it is divided.
2. The whole is (contains) ‘something else’ besides the elements.
3. The ‘something else’ is not an element.
4. The ‘something else’ does not consist of a single element.
5. The ‘something else’ does not consist of many elements.
6. The ‘something else’ is a principle (cause, substance, nature).
7. Definition of ‘element’: An element is that into which a whole is divided and which is present 
in it as matter.
8. Suppressed conclusion: The ‘something else’ is the form of the whole.6
Let us look at the argument in more detail to see how Aristotle justifies each step of the argument. In 
 quotations of Z.17 I have used Ross’ (1928) translation with my modifications in brackets. I have also changed 
the punctuation.
1. A whole, which is one not as a heap (i.e. a plurality of elements), but as a syllable, is not identical to its 
elements, because the whole does not survive the division into elements, but the elements, into which the 
whole is divided, survive the division of the whole. In Aristotle’s words:
‘…the syllable is not its elements, ba is not the same as b and a, nor is flesh fire and earth (for when 
these are separated the wholes, i.e. the flesh and the syllable, no longer exist, but the elements of 
the syllable exist, and so do fire and earth)’ (1041b12–16).
2. Since a whole, which is one not as a heap, but as a syllable, is not identical to its elements, the whole 
contains ‘something else’ besides the elements. The ‘something else’ accounts for the difference between the 
whole and the elements. Here is how Aristotle puts it:
 6 Commentators do not agree on what the main conclusion of the passage is. For example, according to Morrison (1996: 196) the 
passage proves that ‘in the case of material objects, substance is form’. But Asclepius (In Met. 451.17–18, ed. Hayduck 1888) thinks 
that the point of the passage is that the form is not an element, nor composed of elements. Similarly, Menn (2001: 127) thinks that 
the argument in Z.17 is not that the substance is form, but that the substance is neither an element, nor composed out of elements.
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‘Since that which is compounded out of something [i.e. elements] so that the whole is one, not like 
a heap but like a syllable, [is not its elements], … [that which is compounded, e.g.] the syllable, then, 
is something not only its elements (the vowel and the consonant) but also something else, and the 
flesh is not only fire and earth or the hot and the cold, but also something else’ (1041b11–19).
3. The ‘something else’ is not an element. If the ‘something else’ were an element, then granted that the 
 elements are not identical to the whole we would have to posit yet another ‘something else’, which accounts 
for the difference between the whole and these elements, and so ad infinitum. In Aristotle’s words:
‘If, then, that something must itself be either an element or composed of elements, if it is an  element 
the same argument will again apply; for flesh will consist of this and fire and earth and something 
still further, so that the process will go on to infinity’ (1041b19–22).
4. If the ‘something else’ consists of elements, it consists of more than one element. It does not consist of 
just one element otherwise it would be identical to that element:
‘But if it is [composed of elements], clearly it will be [composed] not of one but of more than one 
(or else that one will be the thing itself)’ (1041b22–3).
I agree with Koslicki (2006: 719 n. 14) that this is an expression of a mereological principle, which Simons 
(1987: 28) calls the Weak Supplementation Principle (WSP): if x is a proper part of y, then there is a z 
such that z is a proper part of y and z is disjoint from (i.e. does not share parts with) x.7,8 I will explain the 
 implications of this principle in the next sections of the article.
5. The ‘something else’ does not consist of many elements. Aristotle puts it briefly:
‘But if it is [composed of elements], … again in this case we can use the same argument as in the case 
of flesh or of the syllable’ (1041b22–25).
It is not easy to guess how we are supposed to ‘use the same argument’. This is how I see it: If the ‘something 
else’ consisted of many elements, then the ‘something else’ would be either a heap or a whole.9 If the ‘some-
thing else’ were a heap, then granted that the elements are not identical to the whole we would have to posit 
yet another ‘something else’, which accounts for the difference between the whole and all these elements 
(among which are the initial elements and the elements of the ‘something else’), and so ad infinitum. If the 
‘something else’ were a whole, then granted that the elements are not identical to the whole we would have 
to posit yet another ‘something else’, which accounts for the difference between the ‘something else’ as a 
whole and its elements, and so ad infinitum.
6. The ‘something else’ is a principle (cause, substance, nature):
‘But it would seem that this ‘other’ is something, and not an element, and that it is the cause which 
makes this thing flesh and that a syllable. And similarly in all other cases. And this is the substance 
of each thing (for this is the primary cause of its being); and since, while some things are not sub-
stances, as many as are substances are formed in accordance with a nature of their own and by a 
process of nature, their substance would seem to be this kind of ‘nature’, which is not an element 
but a principle’ (1041b25–31).
7. Aristotle ends his argument with the definition of ‘element’:
 7 Koslicki (2006) is not the only one who thinks that Aristotle is committed to WSP. Corkum (2013: 802) thinks that Aristotle 
endorses WSP with respect to individuals composing a kind.
 8 The wording of the passage at 1041b22–3 apparently supports a weaker principle: if x is a proper part of y, then there is a z such that 
z is a proper part of y and z is not identical to x. (This was pointed out to me by an anonymous referee.) However, the context of Z.17 
suggests that the passage should be read as entailing a stronger principle. When Aristotle says here that a thing is composed of more 
than one element, he means that the thing is composed of at least two separate (disjoint) elements. This interpretation is justified by 
analogy with the previously used examples of flesh, which consists of fire and earth, and the syllable ba, which consists of a and b.
 9 The possibility that the ‘something else’ itself could be a whole is pointed out by Morrison (1996: 203).
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‘An element, on the other hand, is that into which a thing is divided and which is present in it as 
matter; e.g. a and b are the elements of the syllable’ (1041b31–33).
8. The main conclusion of the passage, albeit suppressed, is that the ‘something else’ is the form of the 
whole. This is so, because the ‘something else’ is a cause and a principle and it is not present in the whole as 
matter, and what is a principle and is not present in the whole as matter is the form of the whole. At Z.17, 
1041b7–9 Aristotle states that the cause and the substance is the form:
‘Therefore what we seek is the cause, i.e. the form, by reason of which the matter is some definite 
thing; and this is the substance of the thing.’
3. An Alternative Reading of Z.17, 1041b11–33: the Form Is Not a 
Proper Part
According to my reading, the passage at Z.17 entails that the form is not a proper part. The reason for this 
is disappointingly simple. Aristotle talks about the division of a whole into elements: ‘An element … is that 
into which a thing is divided’ (Z.17, 1041b31). According to this division, only elements are parts of the whole 
and nothing else is a part. The way of division determines what parts there are. One cannot divide something 
into n-parts and then assume that there is an m-part as well. For example, one cannot divide Socrates into 
bodily parts and then assume that his rationality is a part of Socrates as well. Likewise, one cannot divide ba 
into a and b and take the specific order of the letters as an additional part of ba, nor can one divide flesh into 
fire and earth and take the specific flesh-forming mixture as yet another part of flesh. If one did that, one 
would commit a category mistake, which would then lead to the regress mentioned above.
We owe the phrase ‘category mistake’ to Ryle (1949). There is discussion in the literature on what Ryle 
meant exactly by ‘category mistake’.10 The most comprehensive account of Ryle’s concept of category mis-
take is provided by Goldwater (2018), who dubs it ‘conjunctive-cum-quantificational category mistake’ and 
expresses it in the following logical form: ‘there are n things (of one type) and 1 thing (of another type), 
such that there are n + 1 things’ (2018: 342). Let us see how Goldwater applies it to one of Ryle’s examples. 
Suppose a person is watching a game of cricket. He sees a bowler and a catcher, etc., and he is wondering 
who is contributing to the team-spirit. The spectator sees that there are n things of one type and then, hav-
ing witnessed team-spirit, he supposes that there is also one more thing in addition to these. But there is no 
one in particular who is responsible for team-spirit. As Goldwater puts it, ‘To say, “there is a bowler … and a 
catcher…” is fine, whereas adding “and there is team-spirit…” commits a category mistake’ (2018: 346). But 
why is it so that n things and something else cannot be conjoined in a single tally? Goldwater explains that 
it is because ‘conjunctions … impute categorial similarity’ (2018: 350), i.e. the conjoined items all are taken to 
belong to the same category. But, if the ‘something else’ does not belong to that category, to which n things 
belong, then the conjunction falsely assigns it to the category of n-things to which it does not belong. So far 
so good, but maybe we can admit that these items belong to different categories and then conjoin them. 
After all, they are all items, objects or entities anyhow. According to Goldwater’s interpretation of Ryle, it is a 
mistake to conjoin such categorially different entities, because these items exist in different ways and there 
is no all-encompassing category of existence to which all of these items belong: ‘“exists” is not a generic word 
encompassing specific differences’ (2018: 353).
Goldwater’s account suits our purposes nicely. It seems that Aristotle would accept it as well. When the 
whole is divided into elements, the whole is divided into n-parts, which then can be counted and conjoined: 
n1 + n2 + n3 etc. Aristotle assumes that ‘in counting we can only count things of the same kind’ (Gaukroger 
1982: 316). If we are counting sheep, we cannot add a dog, or else we would count the dog as one of the 
sheep. Counting is addition11 and we can only add up or conjoin n-things, not n-things and an m-thing. 
If n-things are parts, then the parts are sufficiently similar to make up the whole. Aristotle seems to have the 
intuition that parts of a whole are ‘in some sense the same, as each other’ (White 1971: 187, original emphasis).
Now, when we ask ‘How many parts does the whole have?’ the response must be ‘If the whole is divided 
into elements, then the parts, which we are counting, are elements and there is such and such a number 
of elements.’ Thus, if upon the division of a whole into elements nothing else is a part besides elements, it 
 10 See references in Goldwater (2018).
 11 Aristotle says in Met. M.7, 1081b14–17 that ‘number must be counted by addition, e.g. 2 by adding another 1 to the one, 3 by add-
ing another 1 to the two, and 4 similarly’ (trans. Ross 1928).
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is clear that the form is not a part. We cannot add the form to the tally of parts, or else we would count the 
form as one of the elements. But the form cannot be an element or else regress ensues.
One might object that the question ‘How many parts does the whole have?’ might be answered differ-
ently. One might count not only elements, but anything that can be differentiated within the whole. One 
might count entities that then would include elements and the form. But if we can only count things of the 
same kind, it would turn out that being is a summum genus to which both elements and the form belong. 
However, for Aristotle being is not a genus (οὐ γὰρ γένος τὸ ὄν, A.Po. B.7, 92b14, ed. Ross 1964). Entities 
are in different ways, i.e. being is ambiguous and therefore does not comprise different modes of being as 
its species. The way the elements are differs from the way the form is – elements are quantitative entities, 
but the form is not (see section 5). Thus, due to their differing ways of being elements and the form cannot 
be conjoined, and the form cannot be counted as another part alongside elements.
I am not saying that the form always fails to be a part of the whole. I am merely saying that if the whole 
is divided into elements, then the form is not a part. I admit that there is a division according to which the 
form could be a part – a division of a whole into form and matter (see section 5).
It has to be noted that, if matter and form are both abstracta (unlike elements), then no category mistake 
has been committed. For then there are two abstract parts, i.e. two n-parts, into which the whole is divided 
and which can be counted and conjoined. The mistake results only if matter is understood as a plurality of 
elements or something element-like, and the form as something abstract.
But perhaps form and matter cannot belong to the same category (say, abstracta) on pain of regress. If one 
reads Aristotle’s statement that the ‘something else’ cannot be an element as prohibiting the ‘something 
else’ to be an entity of the same category as the other entities besides the ‘something else’, then regress 
ensues – regress threatens whenever all the entities that are supposed to compose a whole belong to one 
and the same category (Koslicki 2006: 723, see section 4).
Now we have a dilemma: If form and matter belong to the same category, then there is no category mis-
take, but regress ensues. But, if form and matter belong to different categories, then no regress ensues, but 
then we have read Aristotle has having committed a category mistake.
I think that we should reject the first horn of the dilemma. It is not the case that any conjunction of parts 
belonging to the same category leads to a regress. Regress only ensues for items like elements, since in the 
case of elements (unless they compose a heap) there is ‘something else’, which accounts for the difference 
between the whole and the elements. If the ‘something else’ is taken as an element, then there is a need 
for yet another ‘something else’, which accounts for the difference between the whole and these elements 
and so on. However, no regress occurs in the case of form and matter, since the whole is identical to form 
and matter – the whole does not contain ‘something else’ besides form and matter, viz. there is no further 
‘something else’, which accounts for the difference between the whole and form and matter.
Another reason for not taking the form as a part in the same sense as elements are parts is that Aristotle 
seems to endorse WSP with respect to elements. WSP has the following property (pointed out by Simmons 
1987: 28): WSP is satisfied in a model, where two distinct wholes are made up of the same proper parts. In 
line with the model, the syllable ba and the different syllable ab are made out of the same letters, a and b 
(see Figure 1).
WSP is satisfied in this model, since each proper part is a supplement of the other. The model rules out 
the overlapping of parts, but it does not rule out the overlapping of wholes. This model illustrates nicely 
the role of the ‘something else’. As it is manifest in the model, the letters, a and b, are there as parts of the 
Figure 1: A model satisfying WSP.
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syllable ba and of ab, but there is also ‘something else’, which accounts for the difference between ab and 
ba. The ‘something else’ is not another proper part, i.e. another dot in the lower region of the model; rather, 
it is the arrangement of the letters. It seems that Aristotle would accept the model and the idea that at least 
in some cases distinct wholes are made up of the same proper parts.12 And it seems that this idea is behind 
the distinction between heaps and wholes: both have the same parts, but not in the same order.
If the ‘something else’, i.e. the form, were another proper part, then, since WSP satisfies a model where 
distinct wholes are made up of the same proper parts, WSP would allow for another regress, which parallels 
the regress in Z.17, 1041b19–22:
1. Let us grant that if a whole s differs from its elements, then a form f is present in the whole s 
but not in the elements.
2. Let us assume that the form f is a proper part of the whole s besides the elements.
3. WSP allows for the possibility that the form f and the elements make up different wholes, s and c.
4. If the wholes (s and c) differ, there must be something, say another form f ′, whereby 
they  differ.
5. If this form f ′ is a proper part of one of the wholes (say, c), then it is possible that this 
form f ′, and the initial form f and the elements make up different wholes, c and c ′, and so 
ad  infinitum.
This regress is, of course, only a possibility, and not a necessity, since WSP does not require (but only allows) 
that distinct wholes be made up of the same proper parts. If a whole does not differ from its parts, then any 
wholes composed of these parts are identical, and no regress ensues.
4. Koslicki’s View: the Form Is a Proper Part
Koslicki (2006) defends mereological hylomorphism and opposes anti-mereological readings of Z.17, 
according to which Aristotle argues in the relevant passage that the ‘something else,’ i.e. form, cannot 
be a further part, otherwise some kind of regress ensues. Koslicki (2006: 720; 724) argues that the pas-
sage at Z.17 does not provide reasons against taking form to be a part of the whole; rather, the passage 
when combined with certain textual and conceptual considerations yields the thesis that form is a proper 
part of the whole. Koslicki thinks that Aristotle himself would subscribe to mereological hylomorphism 
(2006: 725).
Koslicki (2006: 725–727, cf. 2008: 179–181)13 gives her argument for the thesis that form is a proper part 
drawing on evidence from the passage at Z.17 and adding an external assumption that matter is a part of the 
matter/form-compound. The argument runs as follows:14
1. The matter of a matter/form-compound is numerically distinct from the matter/form-
compound. (This is the conclusion of what Koslicki calls a Leibniz’s Law-style argument 
stated at Z.17, 1041b12–16, where Aristotle argues that the elements can exist when severed 
from the compound, but the compound ceases to exist, when elements are severed from the 
compound. In other words, since elements and the compound have different persistence 
 conditions, the elements are numerically distinct from the compound.)
2. The matter is a part of the matter/form-compound. (This is an external assumption drawn 
from Δ.25, 1023b19–22.)
3. The definition of proper parthood: x is a proper part of y ≡def x is a part of y and x is not 
 identical to y (Koslicki 2008: 16).
4. The matter is a proper part of the matter/form-compound (from 1, 2, 3).
5. WSP: if x is a proper part of y, then there is a z such that z is a proper part of y and z is disjoint 
from x. (Evidence for Aristotle’s endorsement of WSP is drawn from Z.17, 1041b22–23.)
6. The matter/form-compound has another proper part besides its matter (from 4, 5).
7. The matter/form-compound has an immaterial proper part, i.e. the form (from 6).
 12 At Met. Δ.6, 1016b11–16 Aristotle points out that the parts of a shoe can be put together at random in a heap or the same parts 
can be put together so that a shoe results. At GC A.2, 315b14–15 (ed. Mugler 1966) Aristotle says that tragedy and comedy come 
to be from the same letters.
 13 Koslicki gives a similar argument in her book The Structure of Objects (2008: 179–181), with the aim to defend a neo-Aristotelian  version 
of mereology of which the core is the thesis that the structure (form) is a proper part of a material object (matter/form-compound).
 14 My reconstruction of Koslicki’s argument is similar to Donnelly’s (2011: 228).
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In addition to the argument, it is necessary to bring out several points, which Koslicki endorses:
1) Koslicki takes ‘elements’ as synonymous with ‘matter’, as she repeatedly uses the phrase ‘elements or 
 matter’ (2006: 715, 725, 726). Moreover, Koslicki (2006: 723) assumes that matter belongs to the  ontological 
type or category ‘element’ (and form belongs to ‘principle’).
2) Koslicki does not take ‘element’ as synonymous with ‘part’ (2006: 723), viz. there is a part, i.e. form, 
which is not an element.
3) Koslicki stresses that, according to Δ.25, 1023b19–22, Aristotle takes form and matter (or elements) to be 
part of the compound ‘according to a single sense of “part”’ (2006: 724, 727).
4) Koslicki distinguishes ‘kinds of part’ from ‘senses of ‘part’’ (pace Haslanger 1994). Elements are parts in 
the same sense of ‘part’ as the form is a part, but elements are parts of a different kind from the form: ‘the 
“something else” in question, that is, form, which is present in wholes but absent from heaps, must belong to 
a distinct ontological category, that is, different from that of elements or entities which are composed exclu-
sively of elements’ (2006: 722). A genuine whole consists of different kinds of parts in the same sense of 
‘part’, in contrast to heaps, which consist of parts of the same kind in the same sense of ‘part’. Both elements 
and form are parts, namely they do not differ mereologically, but elements and form are different kinds of 
part, namely they differ ontologically – they are not of the same ontological kind or category.
5) Koslicki thinks that for Aristotle the regress that ensues in Z.17 does not result from taking the ‘some-
thing else’ as a part; the regress threatens only on the condition that the ‘something else’, i.e. form, is taken 
to be ‘of the same ontological kind’ as the elements (2006: 723). Koslicki sees the categorial distinction 
between form and elements as the key to stopping the regress. According to Koslicki, Aristotle’s main point 
is that ‘genuinely unified wholes must be not only mereologically complex but also ontologically complex; 
…they must consist of entities which belong to distinct ontological categories, namely, form and matter, or 
 principle and element’ (2006: 723, original emphasis).
5. Objections to Koslicki’s View
Koslicki’s argument has earned criticism from contemporary metaphysicians.15 I will add some  considerations, 
which make Koslicki’s argument problematic from the Aristotelian perspective.
The passage at Z.17 is not useful in proving the proper parthood of form, unless the parthood of form and 
matter is already presupposed. What one can get out of the passage is 1) the fact that elements are parts, 2) 
the distinctness of the whole and its elements, and 3) the distinctness of elements and form (‘something 
else’). In Z.17 Aristotle is not committed to the view that form and matter are parts or that the whole is a 
compound of matter and form. Aristotle talks about the division of a whole into elements (not matter and 
form). If this is a division into parts, then each element is a part. But why should we assume that anything 
else is a part besides the elements?
Since it is very unlikely that Aristotle (or anyone of the ancients) had a notion of ‘improper part’, it is possible 
that not only elements are proper parts, but also matter and form are proper parts. But elements, on the one 
hand, and matter and form, on the other, are proper parts in different senses of ‘proper part’. Let me explain.
At Met. Δ.25 Aristotle gives a list of senses of ‘part’.16 Two of these senses are particularly interesting for 
our purposes:
‘We call a part, in one sense, the result of any kind of division of a quantity; for what is subtracted 
from a quantity qua quantity is always called a part of it; as two is called a part of three in a way’ 
(1023b12–15, trans. Kirwan 1971).
‘[A]gain, anything into which a whole, whether a form or something that possesses a form, is divided, 
or out of which it is composed, as for instance both the bronze (that is, the matter in which the form 
is) and the angles are parts of a bronze cube, or a bronze ball’ (1023b19–22, trans. Kirwan 1971).
 15 Criticism by contemporary metaphysicians (see, e.g. Donnelly 2011, Sidelle 2010) is addressed to Koslicki’s argument in the version 
presented in her book (Koslicki 2008). Since that argument is very similar to the one I am discussing, the criticism may apply to it as well.
 16 The fact that Aristotle distinguishes several senses of ‘part’ is manifest also in Met. Z.10, 1034b32–1035a7.
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Here we have two senses of ‘part’ – let us call them ‘quantitative parts’ and ‘non-quantitative parts’. Elements 
are quantitative parts, whereas matter and form are non-quantitative parts.
Quantitative parts and non-quantitative parts have different parthood properties. A characteristic prop-
erty of a quantitative part is that it can be subtracted from the whole, e.g. two can be subtracted from three.17 
Aristotle’s commentator, Alexander of Aphrodisias (In Met. 423.36–9, ed. Hayduck 1891), explains that the 
subtraction of a quantitative part lessens the whole. This is also assumed in the Physics A.4, 187b34–35: 
‘every body must become smaller when something is removed from it’ (trans. Charlton 2006). Thus, since a 
quantitative part lessens the whole, it is itself smaller than the whole. Although Aristotle nowhere asserts 
explicitly that an element is smaller than the whole, it seems clear from the examples in Z.17. Surely, the 
letter b or the letter a, which make up the syllable ba, is smaller than ba and similarly fire or earth, which 
make up flesh, is smaller than flesh.18
It seems that lessening the whole means reducing it in such a way that there is a remainder. If an  element 
is subtracted from several elements, at least one element remains. This is so with quantitative parts in 
 general, e.g. if two is subtracted from three, the remainder is one. This idea seems to be assumed also when 
Aristotle explains in the Physics A.7, 190b7 that some things come to be ‘by subtraction, as a Hermes comes 
to be out of the stone’ (trans. Charlton 2006). Hermes is the remainder that is left when the redundant parts 
are taken away. If there is no remainder, we cannot say that the whole is lessened or that a part is smaller 
than the whole.
Now, what about matter and form? Matter and form cannot be subtracted from the whole as something 
smaller than the whole, since matter and form are coextensive19 with the whole. As Aristotle says at H.6, 
1045b18–19, ‘the proximate matter and the form are one and the same thing, the one potentially, and the 
other actually’ (trans. Ross 1928). Since neither form, nor matter is smaller than the whole, to state unquali-
fiedly that upon subtraction there is a remainder is problematic.20
Upon the subtraction of matter, the whole is annihilated entirely,21 and the form is gone along with the 
whole. The form does not exist apart from the whole.22 Even if the form does remain somehow (e.g. in other 
wholes, which have the same form), the form does not remain in the same way as an element does, i.e. as an 
independent item that is left over after the subtraction of matter.
Does the subtraction of form leave a remainder, i.e. matter? There seems to be something left, when the 
form is taken away, as Aristotle says in the Physics Δ.2, 209b9–11: ‘when the limit and the properties of the 
sphere are removed, nothing is left but the matter’ (trans. Hussey 2006). However, matter is not a definite 
thing, it lacks individuality,23 so matter does not remain in the same way as an element does, which is an 
individual whole in its own right.
The fact that matter and form are coextensive with the whole (and thus with each other) does not imply 
that matter and form are identical to the whole (and to each other). Aristotle’s assertion that ‘the proximate 
matter and the form are one and the same thing’ does not presuppose identity, as there are many senses of 
sameness and oneness (see Met. Δ.6). Matter and form are distinct, since a material whole is distinct from its 
form: ‘things which are of the nature of matter, or of wholes that include matter, are not the same as their 
essences [i.e. forms]’ (Z.11, 1037b4–5). If matter and form are non-identical and if indeed they are parts, they 
are proper parts. But matter and form are proper parts in a different sense than elements are proper parts. 
An element is a proper part because an element is smaller than the whole (and thus also non-identical to 
 17 Similarly with other quantities: ‘the half-line is in the whole, because it might be separated out’ (Θ.6, 1048a33, trans. Ross 1928).
 18 The fact that each element is smaller than the whole makes it possible for elements to be counted. One might object that the 
example of flesh is problematic. The elements of flesh within the flesh lose their countability, in contrast to the letters of a syllable, 
which do not. The way out of this problem is to acknowledge that the elements of flesh can be separated out and then counted. 
Their countability is possible because the elements exist as identifiable units after being separated out.
 19 Objects are coextensive if they extend over the same area. Coextensiveness has to be distinguished from overlapping. Objects can 
be coextensive without sharing parts, e.g. color and surface.
 20 With parts that are smaller than the whole it seems universally to be the case that if a part, which does not extend over the whole, 
is subtracted, then there should be some part of the whole, which is distinct from the subtracted part (see Donnelly 2011: 230).
 21 Donnelly (2011: 231) illustrates this point vividly with the example of a statue: ‘I cannot break off the lump from the statue. Moreo-
ver, if I pick up the entire lump and toss it to the floor, then no remaining part of the statue is left on the mantel’.
 22 One might argue that the form can exist apart from the whole. For instance, at Z.9, 1034b12–13 it is stated that ‘the matter and the 
form must always exist before’ (trans. Ross 1928). However, this does not imply that the form must exist before as an independent 
item separate from any whole. The form must merely exist within some whole or other.
 23 In Met. Z.3, 1029a20–1 Aristotle defines ‘matter’: ‘By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain 
quantity nor assigned to any other of the categories by which being is determined’ (trans. Ross 1928).
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the whole), whereas matter and form are proper parts because they are non-identical to the whole, but not 
smaller than the whole.
Thus, Aristotle has distinct notions of ‘proper part’: (i) x is a proper part of y ≡def x is a part of y and x is 
smaller than y, and (ii) x is a proper part of y ≡def x is a part of y and x is not identical to y. The first definition 
applies to elements, whereas the second applies to matter and form.
Let us go back to Koslicki’s argument and go through it step by step to see what is problematic about it.
1. States that the matter of a matter/form-compound is numerically distinct from the matter/form-
compound. Aristotle would agree, but he does not endorse (1) on the grounds that the elements 
are numerically distinct from the whole (as he argues in Z.17), since he does not say that elements 
are matter, but only that elements are present in the whole as matter. If it were assumed that the 
compound of elements can be regarded as a matter/form-compound, then the elements that are 
present in the whole as  matter would be the matter of the compound. But this assumption is not 
made here, since Aristotle regards the whole as a compound of elements, and to mention ‘matter’ 
here is out of place. That Koslicki takes  ‘elements’ as synonymous with ‘matter’ does not make a dif-
ference at this point, but it will make a difference later on.
2. States that the matter is a part of the matter/form-compound. Again, Aristotle would accept this 
claim, but only in the context of discussing matter/form-compounds. But Aristotle does not accept 
(2) in the context of discussing compounds of elements, and in such a case it is false to take ‘matter’ 
as synonymous with ‘elements’. Elements (the total plurality) are not part of the compound of ele-
ments. Each element is a part, but there is no part containing all the elements.
3. Gives a definition of proper parthood: x is a proper part of y ≡def x is a part of y and x is not identical to 
y. This is fine in so far as Aristotle accepts it in certain cases. However, note that in certain other cases 
Aristotle seems to accept a stronger definition of proper parthood: x is a proper part of y ≡def x is a part 
of y and x is smaller than y.
4. Asserts that the matter is a proper part of the matter/form-compound. (4) follows from (1), (2), (3), 
if we are dealing with a matter/form-compound that is divisible into matter and form. Such parts 
are proper in the sense that each of them is non-identical to the compound. But the inference to 
(4) does not go through, if we are dealing with a compound of elements that is divisible solely into 
elements. Such parts are proper in a different sense – each of them is smaller than the compound. 
But all of the elements taken together as a plurality are not a proper part in any of the senses, since 
they are not a part of the compound of elements.
5. Asserts WSP: if x is a proper part of y, then there is a z such that z is a proper part of y and z is disjoint 
from x. Now, it is a good question whether it is legitimate to apply WSP here. Sidelle (2010: 373–374) 
argues that it is not legitimate to do so. Sidelle thinks that ‘the strong intuition in favour of WSP’ 
comes from taking ‘proper part’ ‘as a part which takes up less than the full volume occupied by the 
whole’ (2010: 373). But in so far as matter is concerned, it has only been shown that it is a part that 
is non-identical to the whole. According to Sidelle, Koslicki’s argument trades on the ambiguity of 
‘proper part’: (4) appeals to a different notion of ‘proper part’ than (5), namely, WSP presupposes that 
a proper part is smaller than the whole, but in (4) a proper part is merely non-identical to the whole. 
WSP holds in the case of parts that are smaller than the whole, but WSP fails to hold in the case of 
parts that are merely non-identical to the whole. Thus, if matter is a part that is non-identical to the 
whole, then WSP does not hold, but, if WSP holds, then matter is no longer a proper part of the whole.
If Sidelle is right, then WSP holds only with respect to elements (and not with respect to matter and 
‘something else’). We have to admit that, if Aristotle indeed ever endorses WSP, it occurs when he talks 
about elements at Z.17, 1041b22–23, where it is stated that the whole is not made out of one element, but 
more than one. Furthermore, if Sidelle is right, then there is no uniform set of principles for all senses of 
‘part’, since WSP holds only in some cases. Prima facie it seems that Aristotle would subscribe to this, since 
he has these distinct senses of ‘proper part’. For present purposes, I simply leave this possibility open, since 
a proper discussion would take us too far.
In fact, there might be a different possibility. Sidelle’s ‘strong intuition in favour of WSP’ might be 
wrong. If we admit that matter needs ‘something else’ to constitute the whole and matter is disjoint 
from the ‘something else’, then WSP applies.24
 24 This observation was pointed out to me by an anonymous referee.
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Nevertheless, one thing is true for sure: WSP cannot be applied to conjoin items which count as 
parts according to different senses of ‘part’, namely, if something is a proper part in one sense of 
‘part’, then there must be another proper part in the same sense of ‘part’, i.e. there must be a remain-
der that cannot be a proper part in a different sense of ‘part’.25 Therefore, if elements and form cannot 
be conjoined, WSP, which applies to the elements, does not apply to the ‘something else’ in the same 
sense in which it applies to the elements. Thus, WSP cannot be used to infer the proper parthood of 
form in cases where the whole is divided into elements.
6. Is derived from (4) and (5), and it states that the matter/form-compound has another proper part 
besides its matter. (6) is true to the division of a whole into form and matter, where it is already 
presupposed what this kind of division yields. But (6) is false with respect to the division of a whole 
into elements, because the compound of elements has no other proper part besides its elements.
Furthermore, remember what assumptions lay behind Koslicki’s argument: Koslicki takes ‘matter’ 
and ‘elements’ to be synonymous; elements and the additional non-elemental part are parts in the 
same sense of ‘part’, but they belong to different categories.
If the elements and a part that is not an element are parts in the same sense (despite my insist-
ence that they are not), then by conjoining them a category mistake has been committed, since the 
elements and the additional part belong to distinct categories, but items that belong to distinct cat-
egories cannot be conjoined. If they are conjoined, then they are treated as if they belonged to the 
same category (a higher category such as ‘being’).26 But they do not belong to the same category, since 
they are not sufficiently similar to make up one whole. Elements and form are in different ways, and 
being is not a category.
7. Which states that the matter/form-compound has an immaterial proper part, i.e. the form, does 
not  follow, if Aristotle is discussing a compound of elements, or else a category mistake has been 
committed. Does the same objection apply, if one decouples Koslicki’s argument from Z.17 and 
deals with the matter/form-compound (and not with the compound of elements)? Prima facie it 
does not, since it is unclear what other parts a matter/form-compound should have, if not matter 
and form. However, there seems to be an additional potential problem. If matter and form have to 
be sufficiently similar to be combined, then they have to be regarded as one type of entity, say as 
abstracta. But what type of entity are abstracta? Are abstracta material or immaterial? Well, they 
cannot be material, or else the form is material, which is absurd. Thus, they are immaterial, but 
then matter is immaterial. This is awkward, but perhaps as something abstracted matter is indeed 
somehow immaterial. To properly answer this question, one needs to study  Aristotle’s theory of 
abstraction, which would be a task we cannot hope to accomplish in this current investigation. In 
any case, if Koslicki holds on to the belief that matter and form are entities of different categories, 
then the threat of category mistake still looms large.
There is one last point I want to make (or a question I want to pose). Even if it still somehow could 
be the case that material objects have immaterial parts, then, it seems, one should also allow that 
 immaterial objects have material parts. For instance, species and genera (assuming that they are non-
extensional) should have individuals as material parts. Is this plausible?
6. Conclusion
I have argued that in line with Z.17, 1041b11–33, the form is not a proper part, since according to the sense 
of ‘part’ that is at issue in this passage the whole is divided into elements, not into elements and the form. 
It is important to notice that which notion of ‘part’ is at issue in a given passage depends entirely on the 
way the whole is divided. When a whole is divided into elements, the form is not a proper part alongside 
elements, namely, the form is not a proper part in the same sense as elements are proper parts, but the form 
could be a proper part in the same sense as the matter is a proper part, if ‘matter’ and ‘elements’ are not 
synonymous. I have objected to Koslicki’s argument on the grounds that she takes form and elements to be 
parts in the same sense of ‘part’, which, as I have argued, involves a category mistake. The conjunction of 
 25 Koslicki (2007: 134–135 n. 11) herself acknowledges this restriction: ‘If the sense of “part”, according to which the matter is part 
of a compound, were distinct from the sense of “part”, according to which form is part of the compound, Aristotle would be 
 committed to a double violation of (WSP), viz., a compound which is twice around composed of only a single proper part, viz., 
of matter in one sense of “part” and of form in another’.
 26 Maybe the tacit assumption that elements and the ‘something else’ somehow belong to a higher order category is the reason for 
thinking that WSP, which applies to the elements, also applies in the same sense to the form.
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form and elements requires treating these categorically different items as sufficiently similar, i.e. as belong-
ing to the same category, but no such category exists. In brief, the moral of the preceding discussion is this: 
distinct divisions of a whole must not be conflated and items which count as parts of a whole according to 
different senses of ‘part’ cannot necessarily be conjoined without committing a category mistake.
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